|The Optimal Use of Exhaustible Resources under Nonconstant Returns to Scale (with S.Aseev and K.Besov)|
The paper offers a complete analysis of the welfare-maximizing capital investment and resource depletion policies in the Dasgupta--Heal--Solow--Stiglitz (DHSS) model with capital depreciation and any returns to scale. We establish a general existence result and show that an optimal admissible policy may not exist if the output elasticity of the resource equals one. We characterize the optimal policies by applying an appropriate version of the Pontryagin maximum principle for infinite-horizon optimal control problems. We finish the paper with an economic interpretation and a discussion of the welfare-maximizing policies.
|Estimating the Probability of Acting as a Trustee (with D.Stadelmann)|
We introduce a binomial mixture model for estimating the probability of a representative acting as a delegate or a trustee. Our model also returns the probability of congruence of politicians with the national median voter. The estimated probability of congruence strongly correlates with the observed frequency of congruence obtained by matching parliamentary roll-call votes with the will of the median voter revealed in national referendums on identical legislative proposals. We thereby validate our estimation approach. Since our method uses the roll-call vote record of political representatives as sole input, it can be applied even if the will of the median voter is unknown.
|Representation-Compatible Power Indices (with S.Kurz)|
This paper studies power indices based on average representations of a weighted game. If restricted to account for the lack of power of dummy voters, average representations become coherent measures of voting power, with power distributions being proportional to the distribution of weights in the average representation. This makes these indices representation-compatible, a property not fulfilled by classical power indices. Average representations can be tailored to reveal the equivalence classes of voters defined by the Isbell desirability relation, which leads to a pair of new power indices that ascribes equal power to all members of an equivalence class.
|SLIDES: Theorems for Exchangeable Binary Random Variables with Applications to Voting Theory|
The slides summarize the main results of my research in collaboration with others on the Condorcet Jury Theorem and Voting Power for correlated votes